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Simonton: Criminal Law: Privilege of Non-Retreat in the Home Not Applicable

CASE COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: PRIVILEGE OF NON-RETREAT
IN THE HOME NOT APPLICABLE IF VICTIM
AND ACCUSED CO-OCCUPY DWELLING*
State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2cd 724 (Fla. 1982)
1
Respondent was charged with the second-degree murder of her husband.
Testimony indicated she shot him after he attacked her without provocation
in their home.2 Defense counsel requested jury instructions that no duty to
4
retreat exists when attacked in one's own home, 3 which the judge refused. Re5
spondent was subsequently convicted of manslaughter. The trial court
acknowledged refusal of the instructions constituted reversible error and
granted respondent's motion for a new trial. 6 The state appealed, contending
the castle doctrine or home exception to the general duty to retreat was inapplicable since the victim was not an intruder.7 The Florida First District
Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the State's argument and reversed respondent's conviction 8 The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the First

*Editor'snote: This comment received the George W. Milam Award for the outstanding
case comment Fall Semester 1982.
1. 415 So. 2d 724, 724 (Fla. 1982). Respondent was charged under FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2)

(1982).
2. Respondent and a neighbor were conversing outside the Bobbitts' home shortly before
the shooting, when respondent's husband came outside and spoke to respondent in a threatening manner. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 8-9, 415 So. 2d 724. Respondent then stepped
inside her house and the victim hit her on the head, grabbed her and a struggle ensued. Respondent stated her husband blocked the door with his arm so she "wiggled away from him"
and attempted to run through the kitchen but failed as a result of an injury to her leg. When
he came after her, respondent warned the victim to stay away and then shot him. Id. at 10-11.
This episode apparently culminated a series of family disputes and an autopsy showed the
victim was intoxicated when he was shot. Id. at 2.
3. 415 So. 2d at 725. Respondent requested the following instruction:
One unlawfully attacked in his own home or on his own premises has no duty to retreat
and may lawfully stand his ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
4. Id. The trial court initially took the position that the requested instruction was applicable only to those situations in which the accused was defending his or her home against
an intruder. Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at 2, 415 So. 2d 724.
5. 415 So. 2d at 725. FLA. STAT. § 782.11 (1981) provides: "Whoever shall unnecessarily kill
" But cf. id. § 782.02: "The use of
another ... shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter ..
deadly force is justifiable when a person is resisting any attempt to murder such person or to
commit any felony upon him or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person shall be."
6. 415 So. 2d at 725.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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District's decision and HELD, the castle doctrine does not apply when the
accused and the victim are legal occupants of the same home.9
English common law required that a victim of felonious assault retreat to
the limits of personal safety before killing in self-defense.' 0 The colonies"
generally accepted the "retreat to the wall" 12 doctrine, but a dichotomy developed as America expanded.13 Forcing the innocent to yield and retreat when
assaulted was inconsistent with the early pioneers' vigilante spirit.' 4 Thus,
most jurisdictions today reject the common law rule requiring retreat before
using deadly force in self-defense. 5 Florida- is part of a substantial minority
of states retaining the common law rule that the sanctity of human life requires
9. Id. at 726. Justice Alderman wrote for the majority, with Justice Overton filing a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Boyd concurred. Id.
10. See generally Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1903)
(discussion of history of self-defense). See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 185 (1750).
11. Several commentators maintain that the "retreat" doctrine adopted by the colonies
resulted from a misinterpretation of the English self-defense cases. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 1004 (2d ed. 1969). These authorities assert that the requirement of retreat was not
intended to apply to the innocent victim of a felonious assault, but rather only to those defendants initiating the fracas that culminated in the assault. See 1 J. BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 851(2), at 606 (9th ed. 1929). Bishop further suggests that the innocent victim of an assault
has a legal duty to resist his assailant, since by retreating he leaves a potential murderer at
large. Id.
12. The phrase "retreat to the wall" was derived from a 1328 English case in which the
victim of an attack actually retreated to an area located between two walls. From this point,
there was no practicable exit and the victim killed his attacker. The judges found the defendant was only justified in standing his ground and killing his assailant when lie literally
had his back to the wall. Note, Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri: In Search of Castles, 50
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 64, 66 (1981). "The 'wall' is reached in a figurative sense when further retreat
would increase the danger to defendant's life." 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 126 (G. Torcia
14th ed. 1979).
13. See Beale, supra note 10, at 576-77.
14. Id. at 577. Some early courts field human life was not too dear a price to pay for
human liberty. See, e.g., State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 668, 71 S.W. 148, 151 (1902).
15. See IV. LAFAVE & A. Scort, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 395 (1975) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAvE]; Perkins, Self Defense Re-Examined, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 133, 141
(1954). Although the majority of states judicially recognize no duty of retreat, Texas is the
only state that incorporated it in a statute. See generally Prassel, Showdown on P.C. Art. 1225,
30 TEx. B.J. 339 (1967) (historical appraisal of Texas "no retreat" rule).
16. See, e.g., State v. Page, 418 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1982) (defendant assaulted on common
walkway of his apartment building cannot claim privilege of non-retreat since he had failed
to retreat into his apartment); Blount v. State, 67 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 1953) (manslaughter
conviction sustained since defendant could have avoided encounter by retreating); Owens v.
State, 64 Fla. 383, 384, 60 So. 340, 340 (1912) (defendant must use all reasonable means to
avoid taking the life of his assailant).
17. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 414 So. 2d 178 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (approved instruction
that defendant's use of deadly force was not justified if retreat could have been safely accomplished); Lane v. State, 222 A.2d 263 (Del. 1966) (approved instruction that defendant
had duty to retreat before killing assailant, although defendant reasonably believed himself
in danger of death or great bodily harm); State v. Graham, 292 Minn. 308, 195 N.W.2d 442
(1972) (defendant clearly did not fulfill duty to retreat since evidence indicated that he shot
his assailant from a distance of sixty feet). See W. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 53, at 395-96;
Perkins, supra note 15, at 145. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1962) (requiring
retreat when an actor knows he can do so with complete safety).
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retreat when, practicable17 to limit the use of deadly force to instances of
necessity.' 8
Even jurisdictions demanding retreat to successfully establish a plea of selfdefense, however, recognize the privilege of non-retreat in the home. 9 Resting
on the ancient concept that one's home is his "castle," ' 20 the judicially-created
doctrine recognizes that one attacked in his place of refuge has already "retreated to the wall."21 This exception to the retreat rule was established in
Florida early this century.2 2 Two decades later, in Pell v. State,2' the Florida
Supreme Court further held that the right to stand one's ground on one's own
premises "should form an element of the instructions on the law of selfdefense."24 The Pell court reversed the second-degree murder conviction of a
defendant who shot and killed an armed officer attempting to search defendant's
garage without a valid search warrant.25
In Hedges v. State,2 the supreme court interpreted Pell as implicitly granting the right of non-retreat to a person assaulted on his own premises. This
right exists regardless of whether the assailant entered the premises as an
invitee or trespasser. 27 In Hedges, the court reversed a manslaughter conviction
18. See, e.g., People v. Shields, 18 Ill.
App. 3d 1080, 311 N.E.2d 212 (1974) (defendant
need not flee place where he had lawful right to be, rather had right to-stand his ground
and use force). But see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 19, at 111 (4th ed.
1971) (stating that duty to retreat is "much to be preferred in a civilized community.").
19. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 498 (1896) (dictum indicating that one
in his home need not retreat before slaying his assailant); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1)
(1962) (an actor in his dwelling or place of work is excepted from the obligation to retreat).
But see Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367 Mass. 508, 511, 326 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1975), in which the
court held that the state's general law recognized no exception to the duty to retreat rule,
even where attacked in the home. See Comment, Self-Defense -A Duty to Retreat, The Rule
Now Hits Home, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 100, 112 n.62 (1975). See also Beale, Homicide in Self.
Defense, 3 COLum. L. REv. 526, 540-41 (1903); Perkins, supra note 11, at 152-53.
20. See Lee v. State, 92 Ala. 15, 18-19, 9 So. 407, 408 (1891) ("In the turbulence of early
times ... [o]ne's dwelling was regarded as his place of refuge. Its sanctity in this regard was
fully recognized by the law. A man in his house was treated as 'at the wall'..
21. See Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 747, 775 (4th D.C.A. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1364
(Fla. 1979). Some jurisdictions have expanded the castle doctrine by extending the non-retreat
privilege to places other than the defendant's actual dwelling. E.g., Redondo v. State, 380
So. 2d 1107 (3d D.C.A. 1980) (defendant's place of business), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1118 (Fla.
1980), modified on appeal on other grounds, 406 So. 2d 125 (3d D.C.A. 1981); State v. Barwick,
193 Iowa 639, 187 N.W. 460 (1922) (defendant's automobile); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438
Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970) (defendant's business property); State v. Marlowe, 120 S.C. 205,
112 S.E. 921 (1922) (defendant's club). But see W. PROSSER, supra note 18, at 112 ("Such extensions have an obvious artificial air, and are scarcely to be recommended."). The Model
Penal Code, however, extends the non-retreat privilege to one's place of work, as long as the
victim is not the defendant's co-worker. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1) (1962).
22. Danford v. State, 53 Fla. 4, 13, 43 So. 593, 596-97 (1907) (citing Allen v. United States,
164 US. 492, 498 (1896)): "[A] man violently assaulted in his house, or on his own premises
near his house, is not obliged to retreat, but may stand his ground and use such force as ...
necessary to save himself from great bodily harm."
23. 97 Fla. 650, 122 So. 110 (1929).
24. Id. at 666, 122 So. at 116.
25. Id. at 658-59, 122 So. at 114.
26. 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965).
27. Id. at 826-27. A majority of jurisdictions hold that one assaulted within the home
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where the decedent-assailant entered the defendant's house upon invitation. 28
Expressly relying on Pell, the court first noted that one in his home has retreated to the wall and is therefore permitted to use the force necessary to avoid
death or great bodily harm. 29 Second, jury instructions for a plea of self-defense
must indicate the defendant had no duty to retreat. 30
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal twice applied the Hedges nonretreat doctrine to residents of the same house .3 In Conner v. State,32 however,
the same court expressly rejected those earlier decisions. 33 Conner was convicted of slaying her mentally deficient son with whom she shared her home. She
alleged error in the trial court's refusal to give jury instructions on the castle
doctrine. 34 The court held that when the victim and the accused are legal
occupants of the same home, neither one has the right to eject the other.35 The
defendant therefore was not entitled to the defense of home instruction. 3 6 The
need not retreat before using deadly force in self-defense, regardless of the assailant's co-equal
right to be there. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 48 Ala. App. 58, 261 So. 2d 783, cert. denied, 283 Ala.
741, 261 So. 2d 785 (1972) (husband killed wife); Thomas v. State, 266 Ark. 162, 171, 583 S.W.2d
32, 37 (1979) (where boarder killed boarder, dictum indicates no duty to retreat); People v.
Bailey, 15 Ill. App. 3d 558, 304 N.E.2d 668 (1973) (wife killed husband); People v. Lenkevich,
394 Mich. 117, 229 N.W.2d 298 (1975) (wife killed husband); State v. Browning, 28 N.C. App.
376, 221 S.E.2d 375 (1976) (brother killed brother). These jurisdictions apparently base their
decisions upon the notion that one assailed within the home has no safer place of retreat.
W. LAFAvE, supra note 16, § 53, at 396 n.36.
28. 172 So. 2d at 825.
29. Id. The American Law Institute voted against requiring retreat from the actor's
dwelling when the actor is assailed by a co-dweller, as reflected by the Model Penal Code.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(2) Comment (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
30. 172 So. 2d at 827.
31. See Stevenson v. State, 285 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973); Watkins v. State, 197
So. 2d 312 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1967.). In Watkins, the court reversed the second degree murder
conviction of a woman who had killed her common law husband in their home because the
trial court reversibly erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defendant's privilege of nonretreat in the home. 197 So. 2d at 313. Relying solely on the Watkins holding, the Stevenson
court held the castle doctrine applicable where the assailant and the assailed have "equal
authority and control" of the premises. 285 So. 2d at 61.
The problem of returning to the dwelling after retreat has been a justification for upholding
the castle doctrine regardless of the status of the assailant. Such a consideration prompted the
oft-cited rhetorical question: "Whither shall he flee, and how far, and when may he be permitted to return?" Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884) (recognized applicability of the privilege
of non-retreat between persons with equal rights of possession).
32. 361 So. 2d 774 (4th D.C.A. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1979).
33. Id. at 776.
34. Id. The instructions requested by the Conner defendant and given by the trial judge
were identical to the instructions requested and given at trial in the instant case. See Bobbitt,
415 So. 2d at 725. By statute, the use of deadly force is justifiable when a person is resisting
any attempt to commit any felony upon or in any dwelling house in which he may be. Therefore, the same instruction applies whether the accused was acting in self-defense or defense
of home. See FLA. STAND. JURY INSTR. IN CRIM. CASES 42 (S. Ct. Comm. 1981). See also FLA. STAT.
§ 782.02 (1981) (quoted at supra note 5).
35. 361 So. 2d at 776.
36. Id. at 775. Because both parties legally resided in the same home, the court approvingly
quoted the trial judge's statement that it would be "bad law to allow either party to stand
and not retreat." Id. Only three states other than Florida consider the attacker's status determinative in defining the defendant's duty to retreat. See State v. Grierson, 96 N.H. 36, 69
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standard jury instruction on self-defense was found sufficient to ensure justice
as it informed the jury the defendant need not retreat if it would have increased
her peril3 The court unanimously determined the castle doctrine should not
encompass family members sharing a dwelling. Because many homicides are
committed by friends and relatives within the home,38 the court feared judicial
sanction of the doctrine would increase intrafamilial violence.3 9 The court implicitly balanced the indignity suffered in retreating against the sanctity of
human life and found the latter more compelling.
Under facts similar to those of the instant case, the Florida Second District
Court of Appeal declined to follow the sweeping Conner rule in Rippie v.
State.' ° Unwilling to fully embrace the castle doctrine's absolute privilege, the
court proposed an unprecedented jury instruction that would require a duty
to retreat within the confines of the home when the assailed and the assailant
are residents of the same dwelling.41 Retreat to another area or room within
the dwelling would be required if practicable and if it might reduce the necessity
of using deadly force in self-defense. 4 2 This limited duty would n6t require the
assailed to retreat from the dwelling proper. 43
Resurrecting the Conner court's emphasis on the sanctity of human life, the
instant court denied that the issue presented here was previously resolved.44
Hedges was distinguished on the basis that the victim there was an invitee
rather than a co-occupant of the premises. 45 The assault rendered the Hedges
victim's initial lawful presence in the defendant's home unlawful and his
status became equivalent to that of an intruder." In contrast, the decedentA.2d 851 (1949) (defendant killed her lover within her home); State v. Lamb, 71 N.J. 545, 366
A.2d 981 (1976) (wife had duty to retreat from husband despite their legal separation);
Commonwealth v. Walker, 447 Pa. 146, 288 A.2d 741 (1972) (occupant of house had duty to
retreat from co-tenant). Contra People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.) (father under no duty to retreat when attacked by son in their shared home).
See generally 2 F. WHARTON, supra note 12, § 126 (discussion on doctrine of retreat).
37. 361 So. 2d'at 776.
38. Id. at 776 (citing Edwards, Murder and Gun Control, 18 WAYNE ST. L. REv. 1335
(1972)). The victim and offender were related or acquainted in 52% of all reported murders
and nonnegligent manslaughters committed in this country in 1979. US. DEP'T OF JusT., 1981
SoutcaaooK OF CRi. JusT. STATrics 315 (1982). In Florida, the murder of one family member
by another accounted for 13.7% of all 1980 murders. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 1980 ANNUAL
RE'., C M IN FLORIDA 19 (1981). In California, one-third of all female homicide victims in
1971 were murdered by their husbands. Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who
Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 141, 148
n.38 (1978).
39. 361 So. 2d at 776. The court "would not adopt a rule of law which more easily justifies
the taking of a human life." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 490, 263
A.2d 376, 381 (1970)).
40. 404 So. 2d 160 (2d D.C.A. 1981), quashed, 419 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1982).
41. 404 So. 2d at 162.
42. Id. ("[W]here the assailed person can do so without increasing the danger to himself
or any third party present, (s)he should be required to retreat to another area or room in the
dwelling...
43.

Id.

44. 415 So. 2d at 726. See also supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
45. 415 So. 2d at 726.
46. Id. But cf. State v. Grierson, 96 N.H. 36, 69 A.2d 851 (1949) (duty to retreat held
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47
assailant in the instant case legally resided with the defendant. His presence
in the house continued to be lawful even during his attack upon her, and the
assailed at no point had the right to eject him. 48 The court acknowledged the
49
vitality of the castle doctrine espoused in Pell and Hedges, yet, adopting
Conner, held it inapplicable because the defendant and the decedent had equal
rights of occupancy.50 The majority also noted that the instant decision would
51
not leave a person defenseless against a co-resident's attack in his home. The
court insisted the standard self-defense jury instruction safeguarded the defendant's rights by granting the jury sufficient discretion to determine whether
retreat was unnecessary.5 2
In a strong dissent, Justice Overton attacked the majority opinion for
making an illogical distinction between a co-resident and an invitee.5 3 The majority's opinion affords greater self-defense latitude for killing a lover in one's
home than for killing a spouse. 54 Justice Overton suggested the Rippie court's
limited duty to retreat as an appropriate middle ground that recognizes both
the sanctity of life and the castle doctrine s5 Accordingly, he proposed coupling
the standard self-defense jury instruction with an additional charge that the
defendant need only retreat to the extent reasonably possible within the con-

applicable to a defendant whose lover "occasionally" stayed overnight at defendant's home);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 comment h (1977) ("a man's house is the dwelling
place ... of one who is residing, however temporarily, in the house as a guest") (emphasis
added).
47. 415 So. 2d at 725.
48. Id. at 726.
49. See supra notes 13, 15 & 19 and accompanying text.
50. 415 So. 2d at 726 ("[T]he privilege not to retreat, premised on the maxim that every
man's home is his castle which he is entitled to protect from invasion, does not apply here
where both Bobbitt and her husband had equal rights to be in the 'castle'...
51. Id. The court adopted the Conner reasoning:
[W]e see no reason why a molther should not retreat from her son, even in her own
kitchen. Such a view does not render her defenseless against a member of her family
gone berserk, because the instruction on retreat ... concludes, "but a person placed in
a position of imminent danger of death or great bodily harm to himself by the wrongful
attack of another has no duty to retreat if to do so would increase his own danger of
death or great bodily harm."
Id. (quoting Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774, 776 (4th D.C.A. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d
1364 (Fla. 1979)). Cf. State v. Page. 418 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. 1982), in which the court applied
the Bobbitt rule and found that a defendant assaulted in an apartment building passageway
was required to fully retreat into his apartment before claiming the privilege of non-retreat:
[Tjo rule otherwise would, in
"The self-defense instruction given at this trial is adequate ....
effect, allow shoot-outs between persons with equal rights to be in a common area." Id.
52. 415 So. 2d at 726. In contrast, the district court asserted the standard self-defense
instruction could be construed by the "lay mind" to mean the defendant was under a duty
to retreat from the home. See State v. Bobbitt, 389 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. Ist D.CA. 1980). See
also FLA. STAND. JURY INSTR. IN CRIM. CAsEs 42 (S. Ct. Comm. 1981).
53. 415 So. 2d at 728 (Overton, J., dissenting).
54. Id. Justice Overton found even more illogical the application of the majority's rule to
the Conner facts. Under the instant holding, a mother allowing her adult son to reside in her
dwelling must flee her home if he attacks her. If her son is not a resident of her home, however, she is under no duty to retreat. Id.
55. Id.
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fines of the home when attacked by an invitee, a co-occupant, or a family
member.5 6 The majority rejected the Rippie compromise and has since
quashed the Second District Court's opinion.57
Enforcing laws that discourage unnecessary taking of human life is the
judiciary's paramount function. The instant court refused to expand the
circumstances under which one may kill and be relieved of the punitive consequences.58 Although an absolute privilege of non-retreat in the home seemed
the logical outgrowth of Pell and Hedges,59 the instant court avoided such an
extension by identifying the privilege's -doctrinal foundation as dependent
upon both the assailed's interest in the premises and the assailant's unlawful
presence.6 0 The resulting decision was achieved at the expense of the home's
special place in the law.
One attacked in the home who kills in self-defense must look to his victim's
residence to determine his right to a no-retreat jury instruction.61 Pell, Hedges,
and the instant case all acknowledge that one in his dwelling is at the wall, the
furthest extent of necessary retreat. 62 Logically, therefore, one assailed within
the home cannot be required to retreat any further. Under this analysis, Pell
and Hedges indicate that the attacker's status is irrelevant.6 3 In the instant case,
however, it is not only relevant but determinative of the castle doctrine
privilege. By not establishing guidelines for determining legal occupancy, the
instant decision will produce the disparate results portended by the dissent.6 4
The instant majority ignored the "at the wall" policy in Pell and Hedges and
instead focused on concerns that the castle doctrine's application to co-residents
might foster intrafamilial homicide.65 The resulting rule is both inconsistent
with the time-honored privilege of non-retreat in the home and of questionable value in preserving lives. The rule does not recognize that one assaulted
often has little time to contemplate alternatives for the attack. By instinct, he
will likely stand his ground rather than retreat from the place of refuge.66 Any
deterrent value of the instant rule will not be realized unless future victims of
56. Id. The instruction recommended by Justice Overton is as follows:
If the defendant was attacked in [his/her] own home, or on [his/her] own premises, by
a cotenant, family member, or invitee, [he/she] has a duty to retreat to the extent
reasonably possible but is not required to flee[his/her] home and has the lawful right
to stand [his/her] ground and meet force with force even to the extent of using force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm if it was necessary to prevent death or great
bodily harm to [himself/herself] or another.
Id.

57. 419 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1982).
58. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
60. 415 So. 2d at 726. See also supra notes 4549 and accompanying text.
61. 415 So. 2d at 726-29.
62. See Pell v. State, 94 Fla. 650, 665, 122 So. 110, 116. See also supra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
64. 415 So. 2d at 726. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
65. See Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774 (4th D.CA. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.
1979). See also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
66. See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
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unprovoked felonious assaults are aware of their judicially-created duty to flee
the home.
Justice Overton's dissent suggesting a limited duty to retreat instruction
cogently reconciles the sanctity of life with the traditional protections afforded
one in his home. 67 It is inconsistent to accept the castle doctrine and simultaneously require one assaulted by a co-occupant to flee his place of refuge. A
duty to retreat within the confines of the dwelling, however, comports with both
the castle doctrine and the "necessity" rationale of the privilege of self-defense
recognized in jurisdictions such as Florida that adhere to a general duty to retreat.
Reluctance to broadly construe a rule of law excusing homicides is commendable. The instant court's implicit fear that application of the privilege to cooccupants would propagate domestic violence is nevertheless unsubstantiated.6
of the instant court's reasoning is abrogation of the
A more logical result
"castle doctrine." 69 As long as the court continues to recognize the castle doctrine
as a viable exception to Florida's general retreat rule, enforcement should be
consistent with the rationale behind the rule's adoption. One who is "at the
wall" when attacked by an invitee or an intruder is "at the wall" when attacked
by another resident. 70
LISA K. SIMONTON
67. See supra note 56. By utilizing the dissent's proposed jury instruction, under the
instant facts the respondent could probably establish a successful self-defense claim. See supra
note 2.
68. Cf. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CALIF. L.
Ryv. 1657, 1709 (1981) (stating that the refusal to permit self-defense in the home when the
assailant is a co-tenant would have an unwarranted and disproportionate impact on interspousal cases).
69. At present, Massachusetts is the only state to expressly refuse to recognize any special
self-defense privilege to be employed in the home. See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367 Mass. 508,
326 N.E.2d 880 (1975).
70. See State v. Grierson, 96 N.H. 36, 42, 69 A.2d 851, 856 (1949) (Duncan, J., dissenting)
("If the view be taken that retreat is a positive requirement ... except that one attacked in
his dwelling may stand his ground, then .. .the benefit of the exception . . .should not be
). See also supra notes 19-22 and accompanying
restricted to cases of attack by intruders.
text.
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